IBM Security Z Security

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  • 1.  SDSF Security Migration to RACF-SAF

    Posted Tue March 29, 2022 02:00 AM
    Hi,

    How it is possible to convert the CMDAUTH(USERID,NOTIFY)  in SDSF ISFPARMS (one statement allows all operations on the own and Notified elements.(jobs etc .)) to SAF, without defining for each user multiple RACF profiles. this would mean a Huge no. of RACF Profiles  ( protect.profiles * users )

    ISFJOB.DDNAME.owner.jobname.system
    ISFJOB.STORAGE.owner.jobname.system
    ISFJOB.TASK.owner.jobname.system

    etc.



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    Peter Karel
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  • 2.  RE: SDSF Security Migration to RACF-SAF

    IBM Champion
    Posted Tue March 29, 2022 05:48 AM
    Edited by Rob van Hoboken Tue March 29, 2022 05:53 AM
    The migration manual states there is no SAF equivalent for CMDAUTH=NOTIFY.

    Way back with the first SAF interface for SDSF, we used GLOBAL profiles with &RACUID in the position that should be matched with the current user ID, like
    RALTER GLOBAL JESSPOOL ADDMEM(*.*.&RACUID%.**/ALTER)
    to implement (very) old fashioned submit/status/cancel rules that allow management of jobnames that start with your user ID.

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    Rob van Hoboken
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  • 3.  RE: SDSF Security Migration to RACF-SAF

    Posted Thu March 31, 2022 02:36 AM
    Solution has been found:

    As Rob van Hoboken mentioned that there is no Equivalent for CMDAUTH=NOTIFY.
    Investigation and testing has provided the solution for CMDAUTH=USER.

    2 Profiles are involved:
    CLASS         PROFILE
    SDSF           ISFAUTH.DEST.**
    JESSPOOL  <nodeid>.**


    the SET SECTRACE ON  SDSF command has proven to be very helpfull in analyzing this issue.

    Investigation shows if a user is granted/allowed access to (SDSF) ISFAUTH.DEST.** then SDSF won't check (JESSPOOL) <nodeid>*.**  profiles and therefor grant access to all JES2 elements.
    If the user is denied Access to the ISFAUTH.DEST.** then SDSF will check the JESSPOOL <nodeid>*.** profiles. And therefor over this mechanism you can provide security in a granular way.

    If you deny a user Access to ISFAUTH,DEST and there is NO profile  in <nodeid>*.** for this user, then the user is ONLY granted access to his OWN jes2 elements. SInce a USER ( according to RACF Policy ) is allowed all elements and Datasets he owns. ( In the RACF Access checking is logic built in which compares UTOKEN with RTOKEN ).

    So even not specifying JESSPOOL <nodeid>*.** profiles you can protect JES2 elements in a way that Operators are allowed access to ALL jes2 output elements, and other users ONLY have access to their own output.

    I say Thanks to Rob van Hoboken for his help and support in solving this Issue.




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    Peter Karel
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